Four years after his first term, US President Donald Trump’s return to power sheds new light on the need for European states to strengthen their defense capabilities. For over 75 years, NATO and the US have provided security for Europe. However, today, the new US president might renege on these guarantees. He openly dismisses NATO as a transatlantic alliance and has repeatedly argued that European states free-ride on the US, something he will no longer tolerate. Is he then going to pull out from NATO, or add sufficient distance with the alliance so that its credibility erodes?

New urgency for Europe
The debate on the US commitment to European security is not new. Yet, it has reached a new level in a context marked by a resurgent, aggressive Russia and a faltering alliance with Washington.

For the Europeans, this raises the question of alternative options. Do they have the will and financial resources to develop their autonomous defense capacity? Or are they doomed to remain weak and at the mercy of a reluctant US protector?

Some European states have proposed strategic autonomy, aiming for enough military power to reduce dependency on the US eventually. Over the last eight years, EU-led projects in the domain of capability development and its financing, including with money from the bloc, have started the process of emancipation. However, European states tend to disagree on the finality of such an endeavour. For some, like France, EU-led defence efforts should aim at building a European pillar that would eventually be a substitute for the US; for others, like Germany, building European capacities can only reinforce the transatlantic bond. According to the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, what is needed is “not a European army,” it is “27 European armies that can effectively work together to deter our rivals and defend Europe, preferably with our allies and partners, but alone if needed.”

Insufficient European NATO
However, European efforts will not be sufficient for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. When he spoke to the European Parliament earlier this week, Rutte welcomed a “more autonomous European defence” or what he called a “sort of European NATO.” But he then argued that such an ambition would take at least 15 years to achieve and require European states to increase their annual defense spending to as much as 8% of their gross domestic product, compared to just 2% today.

Echoing this, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke bluntly about Europe in his speech at the Davos World Economic Forum. “Europe can’t afford to be second or third in line for its allies,” he said. “We need a united European security and defense policy, and all European countries must be willing to spend as much on security as is needed — not just as much as they’ve gotten used to during years of neglect.” The Ukrainian president calls on Europe as he fears the US might abandon not only its European allies but Ukraine as well.

European security order shaken
How European states will react to these defence incapabilities is still uncertain, paralysed as they seem by the harsh stance of the new US president. What is at stake is no less than the European security order and a system of alliances established in the immediate post-World War II era.

Russia’s President Putin first attacked this order, but ironically, President Trump might well shake it even more. If the transatlantic alliance loses credibility, Ukraine, Western and Eastern European states, and Türkiye will be impacted.

They will likely suffer rather than benefit from a possible US withdrawal, while Putin would be the one taking advantage of such a development. This awaits Europe unless Trump becomes the wake-up call it needs to eventually free itself from external dependencies so that, as Zelenskyy put it, “the world can’t afford to ignore it.”